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By 
Frank J. Redd 
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Logan, Utah 
INTRODUCTION 
To space zealots, 1989 was the year the drought ended. The 
space shuttle was operational again; Voyager's grand reconnais-
sance of the Solar System climaxed with the glorious encounter 
with theplanetNeptuneandits startling moon, Triton; the launches 
of the Magellan spacecraft to Venus and the Gallileo to Jupiter 
broke a decade long ~iatus in the launch of U.S. planetary missions; 
and, for the first time in over twenty years, a U.S. president 
announced a daring new initiative in human exploration with the 
goal of first returning humans to the Moon, then going on to Mars. 
For awhile, it almost seemed like the sixties, again - a time 
when the U.S. Space program was the greatest. Perhaps the spirit 
of Apollo had returned to salve the painful wounds of the post 
Challenger agony. But, as the balm brought healing, it also brought 
soberness. We were entering the nineties, not the sixties. 1989's 
successes notwithstanding, the nation faced difficult challenges, 
the most aggravating of which was the national debt. The growing 
commitment to contain the debt and the profusion of competing 
budget interests would not allow the explosive growth of the Apollo 
era. Competition from the Soviet Union no longer opened the 
funding spigots and NASA itself, the custodian of the nation's space 
destiny, still found itself mired in the inertia of an entrenched 
bureaucracy. And, while the exploration of Mars and the outer solar 
system excited the imagination, we began to realize that the threat 
to the environment of our own planet Earth demanded that we focus 
some of our space exploration efforts homeward. Nevertheless, the 
catharsis of Challenger is yielding to a new, albeit bounded, opti-
mism. Mars indeed beckons; Jupiter and Saturn and their moons 
await the arrival of inquiring spacecraft; and the Moon will again 
feel the footsteps of humans upon its surface. 
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This lecture will attempt to take a realistic look at the U.S. 
civil space program as it emerges from the pain of the post Chal-
lengeryears into an era of new hope and challenge. Tough decisions 
must be made in a budget constrained environment. We may have 
to find new ways of doing things, or we may have to rediscover old 
ones. Perhaps a reexamination of "first principles" is in order. But, 
if we do it right, the possibilities and opportunities extend beyond 
our wildest imaginings. 
mSTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
It is not the purpose of this lecture to conduct a detailed 
historical review of the U.S. space program. However, there are 
some key reference points that need to be identified and defined in 
order to understand the landscape that confronts us. The reference 
points essential to the thesis of this presentation divide the national 
"space past" into three eras: (1) The Apollo era, (2) the pre-
Challenger era, and (3) the post-Challenger era. Each of these eras 
has been characterized by its own ambient spirit which strongly 
influenced the planning and conduct of the space programs during 
that era. That is not to say there has not been carry-over from one 
era to another. The same NASA people have been on stage through 
all three eras. The differences between the eras accompanied 
changes in national space policy; the people both influenced those 
changes and adjusted to conform to the new policy. 
The Apollo Era 
Radford Byerly, Jr., Director of the Center for Space and 
Geosciences policy at the University of Colorado and a former . 
member of the staff of the House of Representatives Subcommittee 
on Space Science and Applications, characterizes the Apollo era as 
a "can do" era during which "America had set out to put a human on 
the Moon and NASA accomplished the task spectacularly well." 
His definition of the "Apollo Paradigm" extends the vision beyond 
the lunar landings to " .. an even broader vision; a beginning that 
would lead to orbiting space stations, settlements on the Moon, and 
colonies on Mars. America was destined to lead the human race into 
space and it was NASA's job to do it." 1 An important footnote 
should emphasize that the Apollo program was formulated at a time 
of budget surplus, a phenomenon that most of us can hardly imagine 
today. 
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The Pre-Challenger Era 
In its beginnings, the space shuttle era continued the vision 
and enthusiasm of the Apollo era, but it was conducted under a 
much more constricted budget climate. It competed with the 
Vietnam War for national resources and attention. (The NASA 
budget fell to about one-third of its Apollo peak.) The vision began 
to fade as cost overruns and further budget pressures began to force 
compromises in the development. Many feel that these pressures, 
and NASA's reaction to them, set the stage for the Challenger 
disaster a half a decade later. 
Another factor clouding the vision was the lack of a funda-
mental objective associated with the space shuttle program, other 
than the program itself. There was no extraterrestrial destination 
-no Moon, no Mars. The official name of the program, the National 
Space Transportation System, described a logistics element, not an 
objective. The final product was to be an operational system to be 
flown repetitiously to and from earth orbit. NASA was not organ-
ized for that type of task. As an agency, it was programmed for 
singular missions which included a limited number of expendable 
spacecraft. Worse still, the price of continuing the space shuttle 
program included the cancellation of all other U.S. launch vehicle 
programs. The space shuttle was to be the one and only means of 
access to space. Perhaps, in this case, the vision exceeded reason. 
For these and other reasons, the pre-Challenger space 
shuttle era became one of confused goals and drifting priori ties. The 
hard questions which should have been asked during this era were 
not asked until after the Challenger accident. 
The Post-Challenger Era 
Almost no one can forget the circumstances surrounding 
the Challenger explosion on January 28, 1986. That event will no 
doubt be etched upon our memories for the rest of our lives. It has 
also become a landmark event in the history of the nation's space 
program, not just because of the tragic loss of the life, but also 
because it signalled the end of the infallible image of NASA and the 
nation's great adventure in space. Intense inquiry into the Chal-
lenger disaster expanded to a penetrating nvestigation of NASA 
and the U.S. civil space program. Amid accusations of mismanage-
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ment and poor policymaking, the hard questions that should have 
been asked earlier were asked, and, in many cases, the answers 
were embarrassing. ''Why did the U.S. rely solely on the Shuttle? 
Why are human crews used to launch communication satellites? 
Why are science missions and the human spaceflight program tied 
together? What is the rationale for the Station ?"2 
If there were some way to erase the human tragedy from the 
Challenger accident, it could be considered a beneficial event. The 
questions that flowed from the multitude of inquiries and investi-
gations needed to be asked, and answers needed to be provided. 
Changes were made and still more will be made. That tragedy 
signalled the end of the space program's adolescence and an entry 
into what hopefully will become a more mature program with well 
defined, exhilarating goals, a program that will reestablish U.S. 
leadership in those areas of space exploration that best fit the 
national interest. 
Planetary Exploration 
Before leaving this brief journey through history, it would 
be well to discuss the impacts of these events on the planetary 
exploration program. There has been and will continue to be 
endless debate on the relative merits of expensive human explora-
tion programs versus exploration with highly automated, unmanned 
spacecraft. There can be no argument that the funding allocated to 
planetary exploration is inversely proportional to that awarded to 
human exploration. Our euphoria at seeing the wonderful photo-
graphs of Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and the satellite 
moons of these planets should be tempered with the realization that 
these pictures were taken by spacecraft that were launched nearly 
a decade before the Challenger disaster; and, until the Galileo and 
Magellan launches in 1989, none had been launched since. NASA's 
total commitment to the space shuttle program in an environment 
of severe budget constraints nearly killed the planetary exploration 
effort. 
APPROACHING THE PRESENT 
The National Commission on Space 
Several significant events have occurred during the four 
years following the Challenger accident that have strongly influ-
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enced the emergence of the still evolving posture of the current U.S. 
space program. One of these , of course, is the national debt and the 
limitations it places upon growth of new initiatives. The others are 
equally significant, however, because they have been forged with a 
clear knowledge of those debt constraints and have, to some degree, 
attempted to fit within them. 
In 1985 President Reagan asked the Congress to appoint a 
National Commission on Space and charge them to " ... formulate a 
bold agenda to carry America's civilian space enterprise into the 
21st century."3 Headed by Thomas O. Paine, a former NASA 
Administrator, that commission traveled across the country for the 
next year obtaining testimony from experts and citizens. They 
concluded their report entitled, Pioneerin~ the Space Frontier, and 
delivered it to Congress in May of 1986. Its delivery was almost 
totally obscured by the nearly concurrent delivery of the Rogers 
Commission report on the Challenger accident, but its comprehen-
sive, imaginative, penetrating message could not stay buried long. 
The report proposed three aggressive thrusts: "Advancing our 
understanding of our planet, our Solar System, and the Universe; 
Exploring, prospecting, and settling the Solar System; and Stimu-
lating space enterprises for the direct benefit of the people on earth." 
To accomplish these thrusts, the commission proposed two addi-
tional thrusts: "Advancing technology across a broad spectrum to 
assure timely availability of critical capabilities and Creating and 
operating systems and institutions to provide low-cost access to the 
spacefrontier."4 The report outlined a methodical expansion of the 
space infrastructure from low-earth orbit to Mars and beyond over 
a fifty year period, while postulating that commitment to such a 
long-term program could be carried out within known budget con-
straints. 
The "Sally Ride" Report 
Required by Congress to respond to the report of the 
National Commission on Space, NASA appointed Dr. Sally K Ride, 
a former astronaut,. to head a select NASA group to formulate a 
reply. Entitled, LEADERSHIP and America's Future in Space, that 
report quickly established itself as an extremely competent refer-
ence document for all future discussions of future U.S. space 
program initiatives. Noting that the reviews following the Chal-
lenger accident revealed the shortcomings of the national space pro-
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gram and raised serious questions concerning U.S. leadership 
among spacefaring nations, the "Sally Ride Report" stated that, 
''The U.S. civilian space program is now at a crossroads, aspiring 
toward the visions of the National Commission on Space but faced 
with the realities set forth by the Rogers Commission. NASA must 
respond aggressively to the challenges of both while recognizing the 
necessity of maintaining a balanced space program within reason-
able fiscal limits." It further noted that, ''Two fundamental, poten-
tially inconsistent views have emerged. Many people believe that 
NASA should adopt a major, visionary goal. They argue that this 
would galvanize support, focus NASA programs, and generate ex-
citement. Many others believe that NASA is already overcommit-
ted in the 1990s; they argue that the space agency will be struggling 
to operate the Space Shuttle and build the Space Station, and could 
not handle another major program."5 
The Ride Report cuts to the heart of the dilemma facing the 
U.S. space program today, but it meets the dilemma head-on by 
reemphasizing the need for a long-range direction based upon 
clearly defined goals. It notes that, " .. .ifthere are no goals, or if the 
goals are too diffuse, then there is no focus to the program and no 
framework for decisions. The goals of the civilian space program 
must be carefully chosen to be consistent with the national interest 
and also to be consistent with NASA's capabilities ... Without an eye 
to the future, we flounder in the present." In what may be its most 
quoted statement, the report then states that, "Leadership in space 
does not require-that the U.S. be preeminent in all areas of space 
enterprise. The widening range of space activities and the increas-
ing number of spacefaring nations make it virtually impossible for 
any country to dominate in this way. It is, therefore, essential for 
America to move promptly to determine its priorities and to pursue 
a strategy which would restore and sustain its leadership in the 
areas deemed important."6 
The Ride Report then describes a process for the develop-
ment of strategic options which can then be matched at various 
levels to national interests. The outcome of the process should,be a 
national space strategy that is directed toward establishing U.S. 
leadership in those areas which best match the national interest. 
Although the process doesn't make the hard questions any easier, 
it does establish a systematic, logical way to arrive at answers 
which are weighed against a framework of established national 
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policy. To activate the process, the report proposes four bold 
initiatives for "definition, study and evaluation". The study doesn't 
propose that anyone or combination of these initiatives be adopted 
in its entirety; rather, it proposes that national strategic options be 
developed that combine various aspects of each initiative. Intense 
evaluation of the strategic options should then lead to a national 
space policy which provides goals for the future that match national 
interests and policy. The referenced initiatives are "Mission to 
Planet Earth, Exploration of the Solar System, Outpost on the 
Moon, and Humans to Mars".7 
Foouation of the Office of Exploration 
Duringthe preparation of the Ride Report NASA decided to 
organize a separate office to begin to develop the strategic options 
to be presented to the NASA Administrator and, eventually, the 
President for their consideration formulating a national space 
policy. Dr. Sally Ride became the first Associate Administrator for 
Exploration. Soon after the completion of the report, she-retired and 
is now associated with the Hoover Institute at Stanford University. 
Since the publication of the Ride Report, the Office of 
Exploration has published several studies and reports on the 
progress of their development and evaluation of strategic options. 
While these reports have been widely read within NASA, other 
events seem to be overtaking these studies. Most recently, the 
Office of Exploration was combined with NASA's Office of Aeronau-
tics and Space Technology to form a new Office of Aeronautics and 
Exploration Technology. The influence of this office on the formu-
lation of the nation's future space program is yet to be determined. 
The Reagan Space Policy 
On two occasions President Ronald Reagan attempted to 
formally establish national space policy. In August of 1984, he 
approved a new National Space Strategy which " .. .implements a 
series of space initiatives including examination of new military 
and civil space vehicles beyond the space shuttle and efforts that 
could place the U.S. on course for a return to the Moon and possible 
manned flight to Mars."8 It directed NASAto make the Space 
Transportation System (space shuttle) "fully operational and cost-
effective in providing routine access to space." It also directed 
NASA to develop a permanently manned Space Station within a 
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decade and identify major long-range national goals for the civil 
space program. There were few guidelines given for the develop-
ment of those goals.9 Note that this strategy was issued before the 
Challenger explosion. 
On January 8, 1986, President Reagan issued a new Presi-
dential Directive on National Space Policy, following a comprehen-
sive and lengthy review by the Interagency Group for Space (lG-
Space). Membership in the IG-Space included representatives from 
the National Security Council, Department of State , Department of 
Defense, Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation, 
Treasury Department, CIA, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, NASA, OMB, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy. 
The review included a comprehensive focus on the report of the 
National Commission on Space, the Ride Report, and other appli-
cable documents dealing with the commercial aspects of space. The 
new policy was significant in its specific attention to all aspects of 
the U.S. space program - military, civil and commercial. It was 
met with general enthusiasm, although it was criticized for its 
failure to provide quantifiable, prioritized goals and timetables. 
Wirin points out, for example, that, "The policy gives everybody 
everything and makes few, if any, hard choices ... .In fact, the biggest 
disappointment with the new policy is its failure to set a major goal 
before the American people and call for action."10 Po s sib 1 y 
the most dramatic aspect of the new policy was its call to expand 
human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the Solar 
System. This goal is especially significant for three reasons. First, 
U.S. space policy has articulated a specific position on manned 
versus unmanned exploration of space. Second, it established a 
funded program, project Pathfinder, to develop the technology for 
human exploration, and third it brought focus to the to the poten tial 
for a human expedition to Mars.11 
Formation of the National Space Council 
Upon assuming the Presidency in January, 1989, President 
Bush made good on a campaign promise to form a National Space 
Council to be responsible for the formulation of a national space 
policy and the acquisition of the means to pursue it. Chaired by the 
Vice President, the membership of the council includes representa-
tives from other cabinet offices as well as NASA. What makes this 
event significant is that NASA is no longer the agency soley 
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responsible for formulating and gaining approval for the nation's 
space program. NASA still has a substantial role to play in those 
activities, butitis only one of several players. Some have suggested 
that NASA may not. even be the sole implementer of the program. 
Defense Department drawdowns will possibly relieve the National 
Laboratories (e.g. Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore) of some of 
their workload, freeing up valuable national talent for work on the 
space program. Itis interesting to note that the U.S. had a National 
Space Council during the Apollo era. It was disbanded by President 
Nixon along with the Apollo program. 
The Bush Space Policy 
On the twentieth anniversary of man's first footsteps on the 
Moon (July 20, 1989), President George Bush formally declared the 
national goal of returning humans to the Moon and mounting a hu-
man expedition to Mars. President Bush didn't claim that this 
policy was a ew one - rather, it was an implementation of the 
preceding Reagan policy. Although his policy was criticized for its 
lack of a timetable or budget, Bush assigned the responsibility for 
providing those items to his newly created National Space Council. 
That body has aggressively accepted that assignment and is very 
much in the midst of that planning. All of which brings us to the 
present. 
OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND ISSUES 
Opportunities 
An excellent summary of the opportunities confronting 
national space program strategists is presented in the Ride Report, 
LEADERSHIP and America's Future in Space. This document 
groups those opportunities under the four "Leadership" initiatives 
described earlier and discusses each in detail. This grouping 
facilitates the development of strategy options for evaluation and! 
or implementation. 
The first initiative, "Mission to Planet Earth," can almost be 
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considered an imperative rather than an option. Growing concern 
over global change and its effects on the quality of life on the earth 
is increasingly demanding aggressive actions to measure, analyze, 
and understand that change. The Ride Report proposes: (l)"To 
establish and maintain a global observational system in space, 
which would include experiments and free-flying platforms, in 
polar, low-inclination, and geostationary orbits, and which would 
perform integrated, long-term measurements." and (2)"To use the 
data from these satellites along with in-situ information and 
numerical modeling to document, understand, and eventually predict 
global change."12 
The second initiative, "Exploration of the Solar System," is 
based upon the strategy developed by the Solar System Exploration 
Committee of the NASA Advisory Council. The proposed programs 
include the Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby (CRAF) mission to 
investigate the beginnings of the Solar System; the Cassini mission 
to explore Saturn and its largest moon, Titan; and the Mars Rover/ 
Sample Return mission to gather samples from the surface of Mars 
and return them to earth.13 
The third initiataive, "Outpost on the Moon," proposes a 
three phase evolutionary effort to provide permanent human habi-
tation on the Moon. "By 2010, up to 30 people would be productively 
living and working on the lunar surface for months at a time .... This 
initiative represents a conceptual leap outward from Earth. The 
challenge is to tame and harness the space frontier - to go beyond 
Apollo, and explore the Moon for what it can tell us, and what it can 
offer us, as a research and development center and as a resource in 
itself. [It] would represen t a significan t extraterrestrial step toward 
learning to live and work in the hostile environments of other 
worlds."14 
The final initiative, "Humans to Mars," seems to be the 
ultimate of initiatives. The President's policy statement included 
an admonishment that we are not to go for brief explore-and-return 
visits. The eventual goal is the establishment of a permanent 
presence on the surface. The scenario begins with comprehensive 
robotic exploration missions in the 1990s. Concurrently, an aggres-
sive life sciences research program would be conducted on the Space 
Station to investigate and validate the feasibility oflong-term space 
flight. Finally, sprint type, one-year piloted missions would be con-
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ducted as precursors to the establishment of permanent outposts. 
As the Ride Report states, ''This leadership initiative declares 
America's intention to continue exploring Mars, and to do so not 
only with spacecraft and rovers, but also with humans. It would 
clearly rekindle the national pride and prestige enjoyed by the U.S. 
during the Apollo era. Humans to Mars would be a great national 
adventure; as such, it would require a concentrated massive na-
tional commitment - a commitment to a goal and its supporting 
science, technology, and infrastructure for many decades."15 
Challenges 
Two severe challenges face the U.S. space program in the 
future; both deal with resources. The first, and most severe, is the 
budget. The pursuit of any combination of the Ride initiatives will 
require real increases in the NASA budget. This fact conflicts with 
the goals of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
Reaffirmation Act of 1987 - the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. 
That act" ... will require some combination of reduced spending or in-
creased taxes that lowers the annual federal deficit to zero by 1993." 
If each year's deficit target is not reached, across-the-board reduc-
tions are required. However, seventy-five percent of the budget is 
exempt and unavailable for cutting. The NASA budget is part of the 
remaining twenty-five percent. "Put another way, under current 
law, NASA's less than one percent offederal spending becomes four 
percent of the pie in the event that the sequester knife is applied."16 
The other resource challenge is concerned with trained 
people. As we enter the decade of the 1990s, much of the experienced 
NASA and space industrial workforce is eligible and ready for 
retirement. From one viewpoint, this might be alright. The space 
agency and its industrial support system need new blood to begin 
.the marvelous adventure. The real problem lies in the ability of the 
supply to meet the demand. The decline in the interest in mathe-
matics and science among American youth during the past decade 
foreshadows a real shortage in scientific and engineering talent. 
Ironically, it was the Apollo era that generated a tremendous 
increased emphasis and interest in those areas during the decades 
of the 60s and 70s. The crucial questions are: Can the great 
challenge and adventure of an aggressive space program rekindle 
that interest and emphasis? and Is it too late for the supply to meet 
the currently emerging demand? 
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It's interesting that the principle challenges to the nation's 
future space program are resource related. Certainly there are 
tremendous technical challenges. We need large capacity propul-
sion systems that are capable of thrusting payloads into space that 
are enormous by today's standards. The damaging effects on 
humans of prolonged weightlessness must be understood and over-
come. Closed-cycle life support habitats for long-term space flight 
and life on planetary surfaces must be developed. Automated! 
expert systems for the robotic exploration of the Moon, Mars and the 
outer planets are needed. The list goes on. But, one legacy of the 
tremendous technical explosion that began in the middle part of this 
century is the attitude that if resources are available, technical 
problems can be solved. If there is enough in the budget and if 
technical people are available, the technical challenges can be 
overcome. 
Issues 
The primary focus of this presentation to this point has been 
at the goal level of the national space program, but it is clear that 
controversies don't end when the goals have been established, even 
if a basic consensus regarding the goals exists. Issues over the 
implementation of the goals will persist. Some of these can be 
resolved within a reasonable period. Others will persist seemingly 
forever. It is important to understand some of these issues because 
a growing consensus on the future goals of the national space 
program is now causing the focus of attention to shift to these tough 
Issues. 
Manned yersus unmanned systems/subsystems. 
Competition between of manned and unmanned space systems has 
existed since the beginnings of the space program. The focus of the 
conflict is, of course, resources; the dilemma is classic. "Utilitarian 
arguments in support of piloted space flight are difficult, if not 
impossible, to support in a limited cost-benefit analysis. Human 
presence is expensive and automated substitutes abound in most 
proven applications of space technology .... Yet, in the public percep-
tion, the NASA program is equated with human space flight and it 
is a program attribute for which there is a willingness to pay."17 
Historically, the development and deployment of human operated 
systems has inevitably drawn resources away from unmanned 
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programs. This was especially true during the development of the 
space shuttle. Consistent overruns in a climate of drastically 
reduced budgets required NASA to withdraw funds from other 
programs; and, the unmanned science programs suffered. The 
pathetic story of the Galileo mission presents a vivid example of this 
conflict. (See Murray, Journey into Space, The First Thirty Years 
of Space Exploration) 18 
It seems that the issue can only be resolved by clearly 
defining a strategy that specifically sets the roles and priorities for 
manned and unmanned exploration. One author has suggested 
that the unmanned planetary exploration program could be pro-
tected by somehow deciding " ... how much we the people are pre-
pared to invest each year in exploring the solar system. With a 
stable budget, scientists can layout a plan for the systematic 
exploration of the planets. Such a plan has been put forward by the 
Space Science Board. Such a program would be pursued with a clear 
understanding that its overruns would simply delay the program, 
not tax others."19 
The Space Station Freedom. In 1984 President Reagan 
committed the nation to the development, fabrication and deploy-
ment of an international space station to insure a permanent 
human presence in space. Since that day, the program has been 
batted back and forth in an intense controversy between its advo-
cates and detractors. The U.S. Congress provided the arena for the 
nearly constant debate during endless budget hearings. An abun-
dance of grist is provided by continuously upgraded cost estimates, 
program alterations to meet budget constraints, unhappiness of 
international partners, and a lack of consensus on functions and 
missions. The program sometimes seems like an anachronistic 
remnant of the pre-Challenger era. It, too, is a logistics element, an 
outpost without a clearly defined objective to support. It has 
alternatively been justified as a laboratory for the conduct ofmicro-
gravity experiments, a staging base for expeditions to the Moon and 
Mars, a research facility for the study of long-term microgravity 
effects on humans, a platform for earth observing instruments, etc. 
Serious questions about the Space Station's ability to adequately 
serve any of these needs have continually been debated since its be-
j ginnings. These debates are conducted both out of the public eye in 
technical and scientific forums and very much in the public eye in 
the halls of Congress. The result has been a continuing reduction 
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in size and capability. Ensuing compromises in the Station's ability 
to support any of the postulated missions continue to fuel the 
debate. 
There are alternatives to the Space Station Freedom. They 
include international cooperative arrangements with the Soviet 
Union for use of the Soviet Mir space station for shared research on 
the effects oflongterm weightlessness on humans and the construc-
tion of "man-tended" systems for the conduct of microgravity re-
search.20 The utility of the current Space Station configuration for 
the on-orbit assembly of large interplanetary launch systems has 
yet to be proven. Perhaps such operations could be conducted with 
the space shuttle and its follow-on configurations. 
It is unlikely that Space Station debate will be concluded in 
the near term. Although there is some sign of growing uneasiness 
among advocates, the momentum of the program and the reluc-
tance to abandon international agreements will likely insure its 
continuance. Additional cost problems will be resolved by further 
reductions in capability. Only time will reveal the eventual configu-
ration. 
Scale. The history of the U.S. space program has seen 
continual growth in an institutional commitment to very large 
space systems. In its early days, the lack of a heavy-lift launch 
capability forced NASA to build small spacecraft with limited 
capabilities. These spacecraft were usually built in pairs to provide 
redundancy in case offailure. Illustrative are the Mariner, Viking, 
Pioneer, and Voyager series of spacecraft. More recently, however, 
this philosophy has given way to one featuring single, very large, 
very costly, multimission spacecraft. Arguments supporting this 
philosophy include economy of scale (It is cheaper to share common 
spacecraft utilities such as power, attitude control, communica-
tions, etc.) and pooling of requirements (The more requirements 
that can be met, the greater the constituency supporting the 
mission.).21 
Although these arguments may have some validity, they 
must be weighed against serious counterarguments. There is a sort 
of "Magi not Line" effect that resul ts in the loss of an en tire combined 
scientific effort, not to mention a tremendous investment, with the 
loss of a single system. For example, NASA's currently proposed 
Earth Observation System is a $30 billion program which includes 
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two series of large polar platforms (EOS-A and EOS-B) supporting 
multiple complementary payloads.22 While the goal, comprehen-
sive support of the Mission to Planet Earth initiative, is noble, the 
size and cost of this sin~le program equals or exceeds that of the 
Space Station. Its size and complexity make it vulnerable to the 
budget cutting process, compromises in competing scientific re-
quirements, and in-flight failures. Any system includes some 
similar vulnerabilities but the singular nature of large, complex 
systems makes their vulnerabilities potentially fatal. 
Institutional space planners (NASA, DOD, the National 
Space Council) need to seriously consider a strategy which concen-
trates on the use of constellations of small, single-mission space-
craft to accomplish missions in support of national space objectives. 
Such a strategy incorporates a robustness growing from redun-
dancy, which reduces vulnerability. Reductions in the budget 
would reduce numbers of satellites but would not threaten the 
entire system; competitive compromises would be eliminated in 
favor of spacecraft tailored to support each individual mission; and 
in-flight failures would result in the loss of a single sensor, not the 
entire mission. 
International cOQperation. A strong initiative for inter-
national cooperation among space faring nations, particularly the 
Unites States and the Soviet Union, has been vigorously promoted 
for the past several years by a group of notable space scientists, in-
cluding Dr. Carl Sagan and Dr. Bruce Murray. The advantages of 
international cooperative efforts are argued on aesthetic, technical, 
and practical grounds. A SovietJAmerican cooperative mission to 
Mars, for example, would involve commitments by both nations to 
a transcendent goal that would eventually eliminate the tensions 
arising from conflicts over relatively petty political differences. 
Cost sharing in such an expensive mission makes its eventuality 
more certain. The sharing of technological strengths eliminates the 
need for duplicate technological developments. (It seems silly, for 
example, for the U.S. to mount a massive effort to develop heavy-
lift launch vehicle for a Mars mission when the Soviet Energia is 
already sufficient.) 
Arguments against international cooperation center pri-
marily on the risks of technology transfer. Opposition ranges from 
absolute resistance to any cooperative efforts to an agreement with 
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the concept as long as proper safeguards are installed to insure 
against the transfer of "critical" technology. In a very significant 
move to resolve the issue, the Bush administration recently an-
nounced plans to open discussions with the Soviet Union, Japan, 
Canada, and the Europeans regarding international cooperative 
efforts leading to the establishment of a lunar base and a mission to 
Mars. The National Space Council has been asked to establish 
guidelines for such talks.23 
On!anizational resnonsibilities. The creation of the 
National Space Council has established a focal point for the devel-
opment of national space policy and the setting of national space 
priorities. The N a~ional Space Council is not an implementing 
agency, but it can serve to coordinate the actions of implementing 
agencies in the execution of space policy. Although NASA should 
still serve as the principle implementing agency for U.S . space 
programs, other agencies, notably the National Laboratories, should 
also participate. Such participation cannot be expected to always 
produce harmony; some competitive conflict should be anticipated. 
However, if the Space Council is able to meet its charter, it should 
be able to productively manage such conflict. An important current 
example concerns the planning for the "MoonlMars Initiative," 
officially entitled the Human Exploration Initiative (HE!). NASA's 
"90 Day Plan" for HEI has been subjected to serious scrutiny both 
within and without the National Space Council. The Council has 
solicited private and public inputs to the plan, even reaching out to 
individual Americans for suggestions on innovative approaches to 
the MoonlMars missions. A competing proposal " ... to explore the 
Moon and Mars quickly and inexpensively but with relatively high, 
Apollo-level risks ... " has been promoted by Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratories. The debate has been joined. Ifits managed 
properly, it could be a productive one.24 
CONCLUSIONS 
When one really stops to think about the possibility of 
landing humans on the surface of Mars and all the fascinating 
aspects of permanent Martian colonies, it truly seems beyond the 
imagination. Some of us still look at the Moon and wonder that man 
actually set foot on that planetary surface. And yet, we honestly do 
stand on the brink of an exploration adventure that transcends any 
ever attempted by man. There's no question about our technical 
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ability to do it. The real questions deal with our ability to devise the 
plans and programs to take us there in an affordable fashion. Such 
plans and programs will require a long-term commitment to a long-
term program. Americans are not particularly good at that. 
In order to reach the objectives of the tremendous adven-
ture ahead, we must be able to devise a program that combines a 
number of elements into an infrastructure that secures ultimate 
success. We must, for example, insure that the Space Station 
becomes an integral part of that infrastructure, not an element that 
drives it. A balance between manned and unmanned systems and 
subsystems must be devised that reduces human risk by automat-
ing functions wherever possible. Tradeoffs between and scale and 
complexity need to be seriously conducted with cautious concerns 
for past institutional biases. International cooperation needs to be 
examined for the great potential opportunities it offers and national 
and international organizational responsibilities must be clearly 
defined. 
In pursuing the Mars dream, we must also remember that 
the Solar System includes many more bodies that need to be 
explored. Exploration of the outer planets will not be done by 
humans. We must insure a balance in the nation's space program 
that includes a "fenced" budget for unmanned planetary explora-
tion. 
Despite its questionable ability to support all the needs it 
claims to support, the Space Station Freedom can be useful in the 
conduct of research on the effects of long-term weightlessness on 
humans in preparation for the lengthy missions to Mars. Serious 
attention to its role in the assembly oflunar and Mars bound launch 
vehicles must be paid early in order to insure the incorporation of 
design features necessary to facilitate that mission. 
The U.S. institutional commitment to single, large, expen-
sive space vehicles must be seriously reexamined. This presenta-
tion doesn't claim that small spacecraft offer a panacea; it simply 
suggests that the redundancy, resiliency, and flexibility of cons tel-
lations of small spacecraft strongly support a serious reexamina-
tion of present directions. 
Finally, the opportunity for international cooperation is too 
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good to reject. No doubt cooperative programs will open up a whole 
new set of challenges, but there is validity to the view that coopera-
tion with each other on such a grand mission will inevitably transfer 
the conflicts from their current concentration on mutual annihila-
tion. Furthermore, we can't afford to go it alone. The sharing of 
resources, the elimination of technology duplication, and the use of 
one another's assets and facilities are all good reasons to pursue 
such a course. 
We have emerged from the Challenger disaster a wiser, 
more mature nation. Our goals are still intact. In fact, they are 
better defined now than ever before. Implementation strategies 
still need to be worked out and technology needs to be developed, but 
we'll make it. And, it will be a grand adventure. 
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